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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a structural model to analyze the market power of the
retail industry in the French fresh tomato market. The analysis is based on aggregate
data on nal consumption and prices at both shipper and consumer levels for the
two main varieties of tomatoes in France. The structural model is composed of a
system of demand equations, supply equations and pricing equations which include
terms that capture the oligopoly and oligopsony power of the retail sector and that
account for product di¤erentiation. We show that: i) elasticity of demand varies
during the year ii) the retail sector exercises only "moderate" market power iii) the
exercise of market power decreases over time iv) if markets were competitive, in
the case of the "grappe" tomato, retail price would decrease by about 2% to 12%
depending on the year; v) in absence of market power, shipping price might be 10%
to 54% higher than observed. In summary, given that distortions are smaller in the
case of the "ronde" tomato, we conclude that there is a moderate exercise of market
power by the retail sector in the French tomato market.
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1 Introduction
Do retailers exert market power in the fresh fruit and vegetables markets? In EU countries,
as the retail industry distributes a signicant proportion of fruit and vegetables, non-
competitive behavior might have a signicant impact on consumption, surplus and welfare.
It may also have an impact on the success of public campaigns across European countries
promoting fruit and vegetable consumption as for example the 5 a daycampaing. In
this paper, we shed some light on the degree of non-competitive distortions in the French
fresh tomato market.
There is some evidence of distortions due to non-competitive behavior in retailing in
the EU. Thus, in a recent investigation, the UK competition commission concluded that
they have concerns in two principal areas . . . several groceries have strong positions in
a number of local markets, . . . and that the transfer of excessive risk and unexpected
costs by grocery retailers to their suppliers if unchecked will have an adverse e¤ect on
investment and innovation in the supply chain and ultimately on consumers(UK Com-
petition Commission (2008)). Barros et al. (2006) showed a positive correlation between
retail concentration at the local level and consumer prices. They also found that the most
important clients obtain lower prices, suggesting the exercise of buyer power vis à vis the
suppliers. Smith (2004), analyzing the UK market, also showed a positive link between
consumer prices and retailer concentration at the local level. Biscourp et al. (2008) also
found such a link in the case of France. In addition, they demonstrated that in France the
enforcement of a specic regulation (the ban of below-invoice retail prices) has weakened
competition among retailers. Moreover, the retail sector is often blamed for taking advan-
tage of increasing prices to enlarge its margins on the consumer side. The recent increase
in agricultural prices o¤ers an example of that concern across European countries1.
Compared to processed food, fresh fruit and vegetables have some particularities that
1Major national newspapers often report on consumer concern
about rising prices, for example, El Mundo (Spain) (June 2, 2008
http://www.elmundo.es/mundodinero/2008/06/02/economia/1212407337.html ), or The Times (UK)
(January 15, 2008 http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article3189773.ece ).
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can make the exertion of market power easier, especially on the supply side. Firstly,
the fact that they are not processed means that producers deal directly with retailers.
Given that agricultural production in Europe is usually undertaken by small or low-
concentrated farmers, the bargaining power of these farmers in any negotiation with
the highly concentrated retail sector is likely to be negligible. Secondly, fresh produce
prices are highly seasonal and volatile, depending on weather conditions. Retailers are
usually accused of using their market power to lower producer prices excessively under bad
demand conditions2. Conversely, under favorable demand conditions, they are accused
of increasing prices excessively3. Recent studies do not support this view of asymmetric
price transmission. For instance, a report by London Economics (2004) shows that, in
the European Union, most studies point to symmetric price transmission in fruit and
vegetables. Hassan and Simioni (2004) addressed this question for the case of tomatoes
and chicory in France and found that asymmetric price transmission is as frequent as the
symmetric case. When transmission is asymmetric, they did not nd evidence for the
widespread assertion that shipping price increases are completely and rapidly passed on
to consumer prices while there is a slower and less complete transmission of shipping price
declines. They found the opposite, i.e., that price declines are more rapidly transmitted
to consumers than price increases. Moreover, the UK Competition Commission (2008)
found that the analysis on fruit supply chain does not support the hypothesis that grocery
retailers in the UK have engaged in demand withholding in the fruit industry.
Depending on the degree of perishability of products, di¤erent models of price for-
mation have been developed and estimated using rm-level data. For products that are
highly perishable, Sexton et al. (2006) focused on price formation at the upstream level.
They designed a model where producers and retailers bargain to share the surplus from
2A recent example can be found in Le Figaro (France), February 29, 2008
http://www.legaro.fr/conso/2008/02/29/05007-20080229ARTFIG00321-les-producteurs-de-laitue-
etrangles-par-les-mecanismes-de-marche-.php
3A recent example can be found in Le Figaro (France), August 19, 2008
http://www.legaro.fr/conso/2008/08/19/05007-20080819ARTFIG00330-manger-des-fruits-et-legumes-
c-est-plus-cher-cet-ete-.php
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selling the product. They estimated that producers were able to keep about 20% of the
surplus to be shared. For products that are storable, Richards and Patterson (2003, 2005)
developed and estimated a model allowing for both buyer power and seller power for var-
ious fruit and vegetable in the US. The model allows testing if retail price xity is used
as a mechanism permitting tacit collusion among retailers. They found evidence of seller
power and in some cases of buyer power by retailers. They also found some evidence that
market power decreases with quantities that are sold.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies on the estimation of retailer market
power for fruit and vegetables in the European Union. This paper attempts to ll this gap
and to provide insights on retailer market power for the fresh tomato industry in France.
In the paper, we use aggregate data on the fresh tomato market and we build on the
framework developed by Appelbaum (1982) and Schroeter (1988), which is suitable for
this kind of data. As in Wann and Sexton (1992), our model deals simultaneously with
oligopoly and oligopsony power while a signicant part of this literature only deals with
oligopoly (e.g., Schroeter (1988), Bettendorf and Verboven (2000)) or imposes equality of
oligopoly and oligopsony conjectures (e.g., Schroeter and Azzam (1990), and Gohin and
Guyomard (2000))4. Our modeling allows for seasonality changes of elasticities of supply
and demand, an important feature for fresh products which, at least on the demand size,
exhibit signicant changes over the year. We also take into account product di¤erentiation
as we deal with the two main varieties of tomatoes that are relatively close substitutes.
We nd evidence of a moderate exercise of market power by the retail sector. Our results
suggest that distortions are larger on the producer side than on the consumer side and
that they tend to decrease over time.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briey present the French fresh
tomato industry. In Section 3, we detail the model used. We then develop the empirical
strategy in Section 4, and we provide some information on the data used in Section 5.
Results are presented and discussed in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
4For a survey on market power in the food sector, see Sexton and Lavoie (2001).
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2 The French Fresh Tomato Industry
The tomato is the main vegetable consumed in France. In 2004, households purchased
841,000 tons of fresh tomatoes for consumption at home (14 kg/per capita). In 2004, the
French production of fresh tomatoes amounted to 624,000 T. while imports were about
435,000 tons (and exports amounted to 95,000 tons). From November to February, the
supply comes mainly from imports while from March to October it comes mainly from
national production (Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Even if tomato production is one of the most organized among the fruit and vegetable
industry, the production is not concentrated as the 4 main organizations of producers sell
only 36% of the whole production (Giraud (2006)).5 The Hirschmann-Herndahl Index
(HHI) of concentration at the production level is about 400, which is typical of non-
concentrated production.6 On the contrary, the retail sector is much more concentrated.
In 2004, the market share of retailing chains was 79%, 14% for open markets, 5% for
specialized shops and the remaining 2% for direct sales and others. The HHI of the retail
industry is about 2000 with a CR4 ranging from 65 to 70%.
There are di¤erent varieties of tomatoes. The main varieties are rondetomatoes and
grappetomatoes, which represented more than 80% of the market in 2005 (Linéaires
(2006)). The remaining types are allongéetomatoes (about 4% of the market), cerise
tomatoes (about 5% of the market) and other varieties (about 7% of the market).
We focus on the two main varieties, the rondetomato and the grappetomato. Table
1 shows some descriptive statistics for prices and quantities of both varieties. It should be
noted that the shipping price is about 50 to 60% of the retail price. The retail margins
(calculated as the di¤erence between the retail price and the shipping price) are quite
5The four main producers are Savéol, Prince de Bretagne, Rougeline and Océane which produced
about 70, 70, 60 and 25 thousand tons in 2005, respectively.
6For example, according to the US merger Guidelines, an HHI lower than 1,000 means lowconcen-
tration, an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 correponds to moderateconcentration and an HHI larger than
1,800 corresponds to a highconcentration.
5
similar for the two products and amount to 0:9 to 0:95e=kg on average. On average, the
expenditure for tomatoes is about 8% of the total expenditures for fruits and vegetables.
[TABLE 1 and FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
As shown in Figure 2, the consumption of tomatoes strongly varies during the year
with low consumption in winter and high consumption in summer. Over the period 2000-
2006, the grappetomato increased its market share, even if during winter (when imports
are large) its market share is smaller (Figure 3).
[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE]
As illustrated by the example of grappe tomatoes in Figure 4, there is a strong
correlation between the consumer price and the shipping price. The margincalculated as
the di¤erence between the two prices (Figure 5) does not exhibit a trend. These patterns
also hold for the rondevariety .7 There are large and frequent variations around an
average. While prices follow a general pattern throughout the year with lower prices in
summer, margins do not exhibit such a trend. On the contrary, we nd highmargins
and lowmargins during the whole year. The time series of margins seems to be mean
reverting.8
[FIGURES 4 and 5 AROUND HERE]
On the production side, most domestic production is from greenhouses. The produc-
tion process can be described as follows: tomatoes are planted from December to February
(depending on the region and on the planning of the producer). Then, after 8/10 weeks,
production starts. A given plant will produce 5/6 tomatoes every week during the produc-
tive season, which lasts about 10 months after planting. The rate of production depends
7The gures for rondewere omitted but are available from the authors upon request.
8Augmented Dickey and Fuller tests clearly reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, whatever
the variety of tomato considered. Indeed, the values of the statistics, i.e.  10:710 and  7:241 for grappe
tomatoes and ronde tomatoes, respectively, are smaller than the critical test values at the 1 percent
level, whose values are  3:983 and  3:448 , respectively. These critical values depend on the chosen
number of lagged rst di¤erences of the dependent variable (here the margin) in the test equation (see
Harris and Sollis (2003) for more details).
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on solar radiation which is not controlled (it is too costly to light the greenhouses to
favor early production and it is di¢ cult to regulate too hot conditions in summer). All
others inputs such as water, minerals, fertilizers or pesticides are controlled. Therefore,
during the year, there is almost no way to adjust the production to strategically react
to changes in the economic environment. For example, delaying the harvest of a given
week with the expectation of receiving higher prices the following week (in response to
low demand) will have negative consequences on future production of the plants. As a
consequence, producers do not follow such strategies. The only possibility to adapt to
bad economic conditions in the short run is to store tomatoes for some period (less than
a week) after harvest. Thus in the very short run, due to the technology, production is
almost insensitive to prices.
3 Model
We develop a model inspired by Appelbaum (1982) and Schroeter (1988) for the French
fresh tomato industry . In particular, we consider a vertical chain with a large number
of producers o¤ering two varieties of tomatoes which are bought by retailers who then
resell to nal consumers. Our setting is close to Schroeter and Azzam (1990) or Wann
and Sexton (1992).
Consumer demand is written as follows:
Qdjt = D (pjt; pkt; yt; Z1t) ; j; k = 1; 2
where j and k index product varieties (rondeand grappe), such that the demand for
product j at time t depends on its own price (pjt), the price of the other variety (pkt),
income (yt) and other shifters a¤ecting demand (Z1t).
Supply is given by:
Qsjt = S (rjt; wt; Z2t) ; j = 1; 2 ; k 6= j
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where rjt represents the shipping price of the raw material, wt represents the price of
other inputs, and Z2t other supply shifters. We assume that the price of a given variety
in a given period t does not a¤ect the supply of the other variety in that period. This
assumption is motivated by the fact that producers cannot switch from one variety to the
other in the short run, as explained above.
Based on the description of the retailing technology, we assume a transformation rate
of raw material into nal product equal to 1. We also assume linear pricing between
producers and retailers. Then the problem of the retailer i is to choose qijt and q
i
kt to
maximize:
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given the demand and supply equations dened above, such that Qdjt = Q
s
jt =
X
i
qijt ,
with qijt being the output of product j by rm i at time t: P () is the inverse demand
function of each product, R() is the inverse supply function, and Ci() is rm i s non-raw
material input cost depending on quantity and other input prices.
The rst-order conditions from this optimization problem are:
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where C
0
ij =
@Ci()
@qj
is the non-raw material input marginal cost, "jk =
@Qj
@Pk
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Qj
(j; k = 1; 2)
is the elasticity of demand, jk =
@Qj
@rk
rk
Qj
is the elasticity of raw material input supply
and iljk =
@Qlj
@qik
qik
Qlj
, (j; k = 1; 2 and l = d; s), is the rm is conjectural variation elasticity.
It represents the anticipation that rm i forms with respect to the reaction of other
rms to a variation of its own level of production. We allow conjectures to be di¤erent
upstream and downstream. Following Schroeter and Azzam (1990), the 0s can give a
measure of the non-competitive distortions in a market, although one should be careful
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in making inferences about the extent of market power, as pointed out by Corts (1999).
As noted in Schroeter and Azzam (1990), il11 and 
il
22 should be between 0 and 1, such
that in a perfectly competitive market there is no distortion at all
 
iljj = 0

, because
no rm expects to be able to a¤ect total output when choosing its own quantity, while
iljj = 1 would correspond to the case of a monopoly. The values and signs of the cross-
conjectural parameters, il12 and 
il
21 , are not restricted in general. For example, they
could be negative if products were substitutes. In summary, the rst-order conditions
just tell us that for each product the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of the
material input plus the marginal cost of non-material inputs needed to provide the good.
Under perfect competition, the price would equal the price of the raw product plus the
marginal non-material input cost.
This analysis has been developed at the rm level. However, using aggregate data
requires some assumptions to guarantee that there is an industry counterpart to the
rst-order equations given above. Basically, what is needed (see Schroeter and Azzam
(1990)) is constant and equal marginal costs of production across rms plus non-jointness
of production. In our context, this means that retailing marginal costs are identical and
that retailing of variety 2 does not a¤ect the marginal cost of retailing of variety 1, and
vice versa. More explicitly:
C
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i
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i
2 = C1q
i
1 + C2q
i
2
Nevertheless, an aggregate counterpart for the rst-order conditions is not guaranteed to
exist, so they must be written in terms of industry average values. The interpretation of
the 0s is now that they are quantity-weighted averages of the corresponding individual
0s . Therefore, the industry averaged rst-order conditions can be written as:
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From these equations we dene, as in Schroeter and Azzam (1990), the following
measures of market power:
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L measures the degree of distortion on the consumer side, M measures the distortion on
the producersside and D is an aggregate measure of market power. In general, we will
have higher distortions the smaller the elasticities and /or the larger the 0s are.
In order to illustrate the importance of these distortions, other comparisons of interest
can be made with respect to the estimated competitive price. Perfect competition in
retailing implies pj = rj + Cj = p . Provided we have estimates of supply and demand
equations, one can impose competition and then solve for the market clearing price. This
procedure provides a comparative static estimate of the competitive price, i.e., the price
that clears the market if we do not allow for any distortion and we keep other things equal.9
With p we can also compute the competitive quantity and the distortions between actual
and competitive prices and quantities.
9More precisely, we compute the counterfactual competitive price for one variety as if nothing had
changed for the other variety, i.e., in the counterfactual for rondetomatoes we do not impose that the
market for grappetomatoes is behaving competitively simultaneously, and the other way round.
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4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Demand specication
We consider a linear demand function10 of the form:
Qjt =
12X
m=1
j1mpjtMtm + j2pkt + j3yt + j4Tmt + j5Qjt 1 + j6Qkt 1
pjt represents the real price of variety j and pkt the price of variety k. Mm is a dummy
for month m such that the own-price elasticity of demand is allowed to vary throughout
the year. yt is consumer income in real terms. As we do not have that data, we take as
a proxy the total expenditure in fruits and vegetables. Tm is the average temperature.
The consumption of tomatoes shows a positive autocorrelation and therefore one-period
lagged quantities are introduced to control for the autocorrelation of the series. That is
also why we do not introduce a constant term. The cross-lagged quantity is introduced
because it is reasonable to think that present consumption of tomatoes will be correlated
with total past consumption, and not only with consumption of one variety. Therefore,
covariates will explain the variation between previous and current consumption and hence
elasticities should be understood as short-run price elasticities.
4.2 Supply specication
The supply of tomatoes is modelled as a linear function11:
Qjt =
12X
m=1
j1mrjtMtm + j2Sun_NOt + j3Qjt 52
rjt is the material input price j interacted with a monthly dummy. Sun_NOt is a
measure of the total solar radiation during week t in a representative producer area in
10Linear demand is a common specication used in this literature (see, for example, Wann and Sexton
(1992), Bettendorf and Verboven (2000), or Richards and Patterson (2005)).
11Again, linearity of supply functions is not unusual. See, e.g., Durham and Sexton (1992).
11
France. As explained before, sunlight is one of the most important determinants of tomato
production. Qjt 52 is introduced as a proxy for productive capacity in week t because
of this dependence of production on seasonal climatological conditions and also because
the planted area does not vary much during the sample period. Therefore, this variable
would be playing the role of a weekly constant term.
4.3 Pricing equation specication
We analyse the cost of the retail activity. The technology is rather simple as the product is
not processed. It is essentially transported, displayed in the shop and sold. The elements
of cost are thus mainly the wholesale price of the product, and other cost shifters that
in this specication are summarized by the price index of transportation costs (TrCost)
in real terms. Labor costs follow a pattern similar to transportation costs, suggesting
collinearity between them. Moreover, when both variables are used to estimate the pricing
equation, the wage index is always non-signicant. Therefore, we are not using it to model
the cost side.
Inputs are assumed to be used in xed proportions.12 Therefore, we can write the fol-
lowing empirical counterpart of the rst-order conditions, which are estimated in implicit
form:
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The variability in supply and own and cross demand elasticities allows the identication of
all behavioral parameters. These elasticities are simultaneously estimated in the demand
and supply equations. Therefore, the only exogenous variable in these pricing equations
is the transportation cost index.
12By xed proportions we mean that there is no substitution between inputs and that the technology
is linear.
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4.4 Estimation
We add idiosyncratic error terms and estimate the system of six simultaneous equations
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) proposed in Hansen (1982). TM ,
TrCost, and Sun_NO are treated as exogenous variables and used as instruments for
all equations in the system. Qjt 52 and Qkt 52 are considered to be predetermined and
therefore added to the set of instruments as well. Considering that there is only evidence
of an AR(1) in quantities, Qt 52 should not be correlated with the error term at time
t. The set of instruments is completed with rainfall intensity and an energy price index,
both interacted with month dummies. These instruments are used to control for the
endogeneity of retail and material input prices, quantities, and total fruit and vegetables
expenditures.
5 Data
Our sample runs from 2000 to 2006 and we use di¤erent data sources. From the Service
des Nouvelles des Marchés du Ministère de lAgriculture et de la Pêche (SNM-MAP),
we obtained weekly data on shipping prices for the two varieties of tomatoes. From a
consumer panel (TNS-Worldpanel), we obtained weekly data on the quantities purchased
and the price paid by consumers (for each of these two varieties) as well as the weekly
expenditures for fresh fruits and vegetables, used as a proxy for household income.
Meteorological data are from INRA and Météorologie Nationale and consist of daily
information about the weather in Ile de France (for the demand side) and in the northwest
and southeast (for the supply side)13. It is easy to transform these daily data into weekly
data: the amount of rain during a week is obviously the sum of the daily amount of rain
over the week while the temperature is the average. Finally, we obtained monthly data
from the French Statistical Institute INSEE. This monthly data correspond to the fruit
13We use data from Ile de France as a demand shifter because a signicant part of the French population
is concentrated in this region. Regarding the supply side, the main areas of production are the northwest
and the southeast of France.
13
and vegetable price index (used as a deator), and to the transport cost index. The labor
cost index is quarterly. We transform these monthly (or quarterly) data into weekly data
assuming linear change within the period. In the end, we have 365 observations (752+1).
6 Results
For both products, we nd very signicant coe¢ cients with the expected signs (see Table
A1 in the appendix, which reports the estimated value of the parameters as well as the
associated t statistics). With respect to the demand side of the model, all estimated
price elasticities are of the right signs and are signicantly di¤erent from 0. Figure 6
plots the average, maximum, and minimum demand elasticities for the grappevariety
by month.14 Demand is clearly more elastic in autumn and winter than in summer,
following a U-shaped pattern consistent with the seasonal variation in consumerstaste
for fresh products. The same pattern holds for the rondevariety, although in this case the
elasticities are much lower. Cross-price elasticities are positive and signicantly di¤erent
from 0 , indicating the substitutability between the two varieties of tomatoes. On average,
the cross-price elasticity for rondetomatoes is 0:4 and it is 0:7 for grappetomatoes. The
expenditure elasticity for rondetomatoes is positive while it is negative for the grappe
variety, but both are highly non-signicant. This might be due to substitutions among
fruit and vegetables when expenditures increase, meaning that consumers diversify their
purchases. Finally, temperature acts as a signicant demand shifter.
[FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE]
With respect to the supply side, all estimated elasticities also have the right sign and
are signicantly di¤erent from 0. From Figure 7, we can see that the supply elasticity of
the grappevariety has some seasonality but it is less pronounced than in the demand side
(the pattern for rondeis similar). Supply seems to be slightly more elastic in the months
14We only present Figures for grappetomatoes. Results for the rondevariety are available from the
authors upon request.
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when there is no national production at all (December and January), suggesting that the
elasticity of imports could be larger because import dealers can divert their supplies to
other countries if prices are too low. Nevertheless, supply elasticity is in general quite
small, which is consistent with the fact that producers cannot store the product and
therefore, in the end, they are forced to sell regardless of prices being low or high.
[FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE]
Regarding the exercise of market power, all the estimated conjectural elasticities are
positive and signicantly di¤erent from 0 for ronde tomatoes. It is not the case for
grappetomatoes, as only cross-conjectural coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from 0
(cf. Table A1 in the appendix). To have an estimate of the distortion created by the
exercise of market power, we computed the D, L and M indexes dened above (Table
2). The exercise of market power is higher in the case of grappetomatoes than in the
case of rondetomatoes. According to the results, the distortions created upstream and
downstream are of a similar order of magnitude.
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
As elasticities vary within the year, the distortions also vary. Figure 8 shows the
evolution of the D index for the grappevariety over the whole sample period. It seems
that the distortions were higher at the beginning of the period than at the end of the
period.15
[FIGURE 8 AROUND HERE]
Using supply and demand functions, we do a comparative static exercise where we
compute a counterfactual situation assuming perfect competition of the retail sector (both
vis à vis the upstream sector and the downstream sector). In 2001, the competitive retail
15According to our data, in the penultimate week of 2006, the retail price was smaller than the shipping
price for grappetomatoes, thus implying negative margins for this variety. This is the only period in
our sample where this happens, the reason for it not being clear. In any case, this explains the sudden
jump of index D2 at the end of the sample (Figure 8).
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price would be 4:98% lower than the non-competitive one for rondetomatoes (Table 3).
The shipping price would be 21:12% higher than the non-competitive one. In 2006, the
di¤erences between competitive prices and non-competitive prices are much smaller.
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
We nd higher distortions in the case of grappetomatoes and also that they were
higher in 2001 than in 2006.
Consumersgains under a perfectly competitive framework, at least in 2006, would be
small, meaning that distortions on the demand side are negligible. However, producers
would be better o¤as they would perceive around a 10% higher shipping price for grappe
tomatoes, although just 1% higher in the case of ronde tomatoes. Nevertheless, the
distortions were much more important in 2001, with distortions of up to 54% in the
shipping price of the grappevariety. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the pattern of observed
and counterfactual competitive prices and the decline in distortions from 2001 to 2006 for
the grappevariety.
Table 4 shows the distortions in quantities from the counterfactual exercise in 2001
and 2006. For the rondevariety, they are negligible, but for the grappetomato, we nd
an almost 10% distortion in consumption in 2001 that seems to be corrected at the end
of the sample period.
[FIGURES 9 AND 10 AROUND HERE]
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a structural model of retailer behavior in the fresh tomato
industry and we use it to estimate the average market power in the retailing activity.
According to our results, the retail sector exerts some market power vis à vis the con-
sumers. However, the exercise of this market power remains moderate. For example, in
16
absence of market power, we estimate that this would induce a consumers price decrease
for the grappevariety from 2 to 12% depending on the year, and an even smaller reduc-
tion for the rondevariety. This would lead to a marginal increase in the consumption
of tomatoes. While the retail sector is concentrated, these results suggest that, for this
product, the competition among retailers is e¤ective. A possible explanation may be that
consumers select their retail shop according to the prices of a small number of products,
among them the tomato. Then price competition among retailers is rather toughas a
low price for this product is a tool to attract consumers.
It is mainly producers of tomatoes who su¤er from the market power of the retail
industry. In absence of market power, the shipping price might be 1 to 21% higher than
the observed one for rondetomatoes and 10 to 54% higher for grappetomatoes. Given
the inelasticity of supply this has no signicant impact on quantities. It is mainly a
transfer from producers to retailers. In the long run this might have some consequences
as it could lower the protability of production and therefore it could also discourage the
entry of new producers.
Finally, according to our results, the exercise of market power was larger in 2001 than
in 2006.
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Tables
Table 1 : Summary statistics.
Average Std. Dev. Min. Max.
RondeTomato
Shipping price 0:84 0:31 0:27 2:03
Retail price 1:74 0:32 1:13 2:96
Quantity 3; 433 1; 340 1; 112 7; 797
GrappeTomato
Shipping price 1:26 0:43 0:42 2:61
Retail price 2:21 0:44 1:18 3:69
Quantity 2; 316 1; 424 431 6; 212
(Weekly data. Prices expressed in e/kg, quantities in Tons)
Table 2: Average Distortion due to the exercise of market power (%).
RondeTomato GrappeTomato
2001 2006 2001 2006
Upstream (M) 5:06  0:78 19:35 6:22
Downstream (L) 6:61 0:71 18:47 1:71
Total16(D) 16:45 0:26 67:35 11:98
Table 3: Average di¤erence between observed price and competitive prices (in % of observed price).
RondeTomato GrappeTomato
2001 2006 2001 2006
Retail price  4:98  0:28  12:13  2:14
Shipping price 21:12 1:06 54:54 9:89
16Recall that D is a weighted sum of L and M : D = pp rL+
r
p rM 6= L+M
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Table 4: Average di¤erence between observed and competitive quantities (in % of observed quantity).
2001 2006
RondeTomato 1:25 0:08
GrappeTomato 9:36 1:24
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Figures
Monthly supply of tomatoes in France - 2004.
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Figure 1: Monthly supply of tomatoes in France, 2004.
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Figure 2: Consumption of rondetomatoes and grappetomatoes from 2000 to 2006 (T./week).
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Figure 3: Relative share of rondetomatoes and grappetomatoes from 2000 to 2006.
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Figure 4: GrappeTomatoes: Retail price and shipping price from 2000 to 2006 (e/kg).
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Figure 5: Grappetomatoes: Retail Margin from 2000 to 2006 (e/kg).
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Figure 6: Monthly average of retail price-elasticities, grappetomato (absolute value).
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Figure 7: Monthly average of shipping price-elasticities, grappetomato.
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Figure 8: Total distortion due to market power, grappetomato.
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Figure 9: Evolution of retail prices for grappetomatoes from 2001 to 2006.
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Figure 10: Evolution of shipping prices for grappetomatoes from 2001 to 2006.
27
Appendix
Table A1: Results from the estimation of the full system.
RondeTomato GrappeTomato
Demand parameters Value t-statistic Value t-statistic
January  801:165  4:310  588:339  6:325
February  769:888  4:415  582:954  5:785
March  743:850  4:648  584:794  5:590
April  701:428  4:734  579:016  5:204
May  522:117  3:802  541:035  4:699
June  567:788  4:343  703:794  5:385
July  767:123  6:146  1; 113:147  8:540
August  928:604  7:101  1; 054:188  8:217
September  912:786  6:383  936:558  7:912
October  883:446  5:717  798:371  7:517
November  894:331  5:302  682:989  6:887
December  905:884  5:022  625:461  6:531
Cross-price e¤ect 649:520 4:923 766:180 5:596
Income 0:0002 0:191  0:0003  0:223
Temperature 20:530 6:436 24:710 6:784
Qt 1 own 0:894 30:40 0:852 24:203
Qt 1 cross 0:010 0:319 0:097 3:351
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RondeTomato GrappeTomato
Supply parameters Value t-statistic Value t-statistic
January 1; 267:220 9:500 256:770 13:755
February 851:332 7:590 208:578 6:964
March 616:219 6:020 290:638 8:562
April 447:212 4:508 556:658 8:380
May 918:312 5:030 1; 211:372 10:064
June 1; 391:096 5:994 2; 219:923 15:774
July 1; 643:781 7:292 1; 517:753 12:399
August 760:860 5:332 542:047 5:754
September 636:013 5:606 372:909 6:361
October 967:404 10:251 389:848 12:435
November 1; 051:704 11:587 513:860 13:998
December 971:989 13:061 282:026 11:200
Qt 52 0:592 33:859 0:449 20:924
Sun_NO 0:068 9:722 0:078 14:275
Conjectural elasticities RondeTomato GrappeTomato
Demand side Value t-statistic Value t-statistic
 own 0:052 2:936 0:005 0:483
 cross 0:022 2:708 0:071 2:902
Supply side
 own 0:012 1:973  0:010  1:620
 cross  0:015  2:636 0:024 2:671
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